A senior House Republican is urging the Pentagon to expand restrictions on U.S.-funded research involving dozens of Chinese universities and laboratories, including some of China’s most prominent schools, over concerns that American research could help advance the Chinese military.
Rep. John Moolenaar (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Select Committee on China, asked Secretary of War Pete Hegseth to expand the Pentagon’s research-security blacklist to cover additional Chinese institutions and government-sponsored researchers.
The universities include Tsinghua University, Peking University, Zhejiang University, and Wuhan University—institutions that are among China’s best known centers of higher education and scientific research.
If adopted, the recommendations could prevent researchers at American universities from using Pentagon funding for certain collaborations with the designated Chinese institutions. The proposal would also reach individuals receiving Chinese government scholarship support, even when their universities are not on the Pentagon’s restricted list.
Some institutions named in the letter already appear on the Pentagon’s existing list.
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National Security Risk
The Pentagon maintains a list, known as the Section 1286 list, of foreign research institutions considered potential national security risks because of their relationships with foreign militaries or intelligence organizations.
Under rules taking effect in fiscal year 2026, Pentagon funding cannot be used for fundamental research involving institutions on that list. Fundamental research generally refers to scientific work intended for publication and broad public use, rather than classified military projects.
The Pentagon’s July update identified 130 academic and research institutions in China, Russia, and Iran.
Moolenaar argues that the existing list does not adequately cover China’s defense research network.
His proposal focuses particularly on Chinese universities with formal ties to the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, or SASTIND, a Chinese government agency responsible for overseeing defense-related science, weapons development, and research conducted outside the People’s Liberation Army.
According to the committee, the 58 universities were selected for formal relationships with SASTIND rather than for belonging to China’s broader higher education system.
Several schools are already on the Pentagon’s list, including Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Xidian University.
In other cases, the Pentagon has designated a particular research center without listing the entire university. For example, Tsinghua University’s Center for International Security and Strategy appears on the existing list, but Tsinghua University as a whole does not.
The committee wants the Pentagon to review the institutions for broader restrictions based on their relationships with China’s defense research system.
From University Partnerships to Military Research
The letter also seeks to expand the list of restricted Chinese laboratories, including facilities working on technologies relevant to missiles, military aircraft, underwater warfare, electronic systems, and semiconductors.
The committee’s supporting database identifies laboratories associated with Chinese universities, military research institutions, and state-owned defense companies.
Some specialize in fields that have both civilian and military applications. Research into advanced materials, for example, can support commercial manufacturing as well as military aircraft and weapons systems.
The concern, according to Moolenaar, is that research conducted with American universities could contribute to China’s defense capabilities even when the U.S.-funded work itself is not classified.
His letter draws on research, conducted by the U.S. Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute and other organizations, that has documented relationships between Chinese laboratories and the country’s military-industrial system.
The proposal also names 14 institutes of the Chinese Academy of Sciences that the committee identified as major research partners of China’s defense sector.
Chinese Government Scholarships
Beyond restricting institutions, Moolenaar wants to limit participation by researchers who receive funding through Chinese government programs.
The letter identifies 22 talent recruitment programs focused on advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and semiconductors. The committee argues that these programs can help China obtain specialized expertise from scientists working abroad and concentrate research talent in strategic industries.
Its most far-reaching individual restriction would apply to the China Scholarship Council, which finances Chinese students and researchers studying overseas.
Moolenaar called for anyone receiving council financial support—including graduate students, postdoctoral researchers, and other research personnel—to be barred from participating in Pentagon-funded research during the period of that support.
The proposed rule would apply even if a researcher were not formally named as a principal investigator or other participant in a federal grant.
The committee cited concerns that council-funded students are required to report their academic progress and research activities to Chinese diplomatic missions. It also raised concerns about political oversight of scholarship recipients.
Unlike an institution-based restriction, the proposed scholarship rule would follow the individual researcher. It would apply because of financial support from the China Scholarship Council, not because of a student’s Chinese nationality.
Earlier Investigations and Pentagon Action
The recommendations follow congressional investigations into how federally funded research at American universities can involve institutions and researchers connected to China.
Moolenaar argues that those efforts need to be accompanied by a more complete list of Chinese institutions associated with military research.
The chairman said the proposed restrictions would not prohibit U.S. researchers from working with Chinese institutions generally. Instead, he said they would target a limited group of universities, laboratories, and programs with documented ties to China’s defense research system, leaving the overwhelming majority of Chinese institutions outside the proposed restrictions.
